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1 .  Universal and Existential Interpretations of Donkey Sentences 
The classical analysis of donkey sentences like ( 1 .a,b) in Kamp ( 1 98 1 )  and Heim 
( 1 982) assigns them truth conditions as given in (2.a). That is, they are treated as 
quantifications over farmer-donkey pairs. Partee ( 1 984) and Kadmon ( 1 987) have 
pointed out that the proper reading of ( 1 .b), and a preferred reading of ( La), is 
rather a quantification over farmers, as illustrated in (2.b). 
( 1 )  a. I f  a farmer owns a donkey, he usually beats it. 
b. Most farmers who own a donkey beat it 
(2) a. MOST({ (X,y)1 FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)} ,  
{ (x,y)1 BEAT(X,y) } )  
b. MosT( {xI 3y[ FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)] } , 
{xl x BEATS(DONKEY OF(X») } )  
c. MOST(A, B)  <=> card(AnB) > card(A-B) 
(2.a) is called the symmetric interpretation, and (2.b) the (subject-) asymmetric 
interpretation by Kadmon ( 1 987). In (2.b), the donkey variable y is called de­
pendent. With asymmetric interpretations the question arises how the dependent 
variable is  interpreted within the second argument, the nuclear scope. This issue is 
taken up in Rooth ( 1 987) .  He distinguishes two cases, a "weak" or existential 
interpretation as in (3 .a), and a "strong" or universal interpretation as in (3 .b). 1 
(3 )  a .  MOST( { xI 3Y [FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X,y)] } ,  
{ xI 3Y[FARMER(x) /\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y) /\ BEAT(X,y)] } )  
b .  MOST( {x l  3Y[FARMER(X) /\ DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X,y)] } ,  
{x l  VY[FARMER(X) /\ DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X,y)] � BEAT(X,y)] } )  
(3 .a) says that most farmers that own a donkey beat at least one o f  their donkeys .  
(3 .b) says that most of those farmers beat each of their donkeys. The question i s :  
What determines the choice of  reading in  asymmetric quantifications? 
2. Upward- and Downward-Entailing Contexts 
Rooth ( 1 987) observes that there is a correlation between existential and universal 
interpretation of the dependent variable and the quantifier of the donkey sentence: 
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Quantifiers like every and most favor an existential interpretation, quantifiers like 
no favor a universal interpretation: 
(4) a. Every fanner that owns a donkey beats it. 
EVERY( {xI3y[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)] } ,  
{xl\fy[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)] ..... BEAT(X,y)] } )  
b. No fanner that owns a donkey beats it. 
No({xI3y[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)] } ,  
{xI3y[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y) 1\ BEAT(X,y)] } )  
c. EVERY(A, B )  <=> A�B, No(A, B )  <=> ArlB = 0. 
In typical circumstances2 , a sentence like (4.a) would be considered false if there 
is some fanner that does not beat all of his donkeys, and a sentence like (4.b) 
would be considered false if there is some fanner that beats one of his donkeys, 
even if he does not beat his other donkeys. 
One crucial property that distinguishes quantifiers like every and most on 
the one hand and no on the other is that every and most are upward entailing in 
their nuclear scope, whereas no is downward entailing. Hence a promising hy­
pothesis is that quantifiers that are upward entailing prefer the existential interpre­
tation of the dependent variable, whereas downward entailing quantifiers prefer 
the universal interpretation. Kanazawa ( 1 994) calls this Rooth's Generalization. 
Other examples that confirm this hypothesis can be found easily. The following 
downward-entailing quantifiers clearly prefer the existential interpretation of the 
dependent variable. For example, (5.a) says that few fanners who own a donkey 
beat any of their donkeys. 
(5) a. Few fanners who own a donkey beat it. 
b. At most three fanners who own a donkey beat it. 
Kanazawa points out a problem with Rooth' s  Generalization: The quanti­
fier not every, though downward entai l ing in its standard analysis (6.b), does not 
behave as expected. Sentence (6.a) expresses that there is at least one fanner that 
does not beat any of his donkeys, that is, the dependent variable is interpreted 
universal ly: 
(6) a. Not every farmer who owns a donkey beats it .  
NOTEVERy( {x I 3Y[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y)] } , 
{x l  \fY[FARMER(X) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ OWN(X,y) ..... BEAT(X,y)] } )  
b .  NOTEVERY(A, B )  <=> -,A�B 
Not every, analyzed as a quantificational determiner, is a proportional determiner 
that is downward entai ling in its nuclear scope; a sentence like Not every A B ex­
presses that less than 1 00 percent of the A have the property B. Interestingly, 
other quantifiers of this type abide by Rooth' s  Generalization. For example, less 
than 90 percent of the clearly prefers the existential interpretation of the depend-
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ent variable. Sentence (7.a) says that less than 90 percent of the farmers who own 
a donkey beat any donkey that they have. The same point could be made with the 
detenniner less than 100 percent of the, which should be synonymous with not 
every, under the usual interpretation. 
(7) a. Less than 90 percent of the farmers who own a donkey beat it. 
LEss90%( {xI 3Y[FARMER(x) /\ DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X,y)] } , 
{xI 3y[FARMER(x) /\ DONKEY(y) /\ OWN(X,y) /\ BEAT(X,y)] } )  
b. LEss90%(A, B )  <=> card(AtlB) < 0 . 9  • card(A) 
I would like to propose that not every, contrary to received opinion, cannot 
be rendered by the logical constant NOTEVERY defined in (6.b). Rather, sentences 
of the form not every A B are primarily used to deny an explict or implicit univer­
sal claim of the meaning EVERY(I IA I I ,  I IBID. In this they are similar to sentences of 
the form It is not the case that S, or It is not true that S, which are typically used 
to deny an explicit or implicit claim I ISI I .  This i s  obvious in  the case of  contrastive 
negation, when the contituent every is in focus, but also holds in other cases. In 
contrast, the truth-conditionally equivalent quantifier less than 100 percent of the 
cannot be used as easily in this way: 
(8) a. A: All the politicans are crooks. They just work for their own pocket. 
b. B :  Well, not every politician wants to enrich himself. 
c. B :  # Well, less than 1 00 percent of the politicians want to enrich 
themselves. 
A consequence of this analysis is that not every, in its idiomatic use, is not 
downward entail ing in its nuclear scope. Recall that a quantified statement of the 
form Q A B is downward entailing in B iff it entails, for every B' with I IB 1 1  !;;; I IB I I ,  
that Q A B '. Now, if a statement of the form Not every A B is possible only as a 
denial of a contextually present universal statement EVERY( I IA I I ,  I IBID, then state­
ments like Not every A B', with I IB 1 1  c I IBI I ,  are not, in general, felicitous in the 
context in which Not every A B has been uttered. Hence the issue of whether Not 
every A B is downward entailing or not does not arise. Independent evidence for 
that comes from the fact that negative polarity items, which in general indicate 
downward entai l ing contexts, do not occur in the nuclear scope of not every. This 
is in sharp contrast with quantifiers l ike less than 90 percent of 
(9) a. *Not every tourist will ever visit Neuschwanstein. 
b. Less than 90 percent of the tourists wil l  ever visit Neuschwanstein. 
Now, if the primary function of sentences of the type not every A B is  to 
deny universal claims EVERY(I IA I I ,  I IB I I ) ,  then we should expect that, in case the 
universal claim happens to be a donkey sentence with a dependent variable, that 
the dependent variable is interpreted in the way characteristic for the sentence 
being denied, that is, characteristic for universal quantifiers. That is, we should 
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expect that the dependent variable is interpreted existentially. Consequently, we 
can uphold Rooth's Generalization against Kanazawa's  objection. 
3. Total and Partial Predicates in Plural Predications and Donkey Sentences 
Let me leave the subject of existential and universal interpretations of dependent 
variables for a moment. Consider the following example: 
( 1 0) a. I returned to the house because I thought I had left the windows open. 
b. But when I came back I found that the windows were closed. 
Clearly, the preferred interpretation of ( l O.a) is that I thought that I had left one or 
more of the windows open, whereas the preferred interpretation of ( 1 0.b) is that I 
found out that all the windows were closed. 
Y oon ( 1 994, to appear), who has investigated this phenomenon, proposes 
a lexical distinction between total and partial predicates. If we apply a total 
predicate like closed to an individual with parts, like the referent of the windows, 
we get a true sentence only if the predicate applies to every part. If we apply a 
partial predicate like open to it, then we get a true sentence already if the predicate 
applies to some of the parts. In a sense, to be closed indicates the absence of 
openness, whereas to be open indicates the mere presence of openness within an 
object. If OPEN(X) expresses that all parts of x are open, then we can render the 
English predicates open and closed as follows, where s;;; denotes the part relation. 
( 1 1 )  a. open: h::Jy [ys;;;x 1\ OPEN(y)] 
b. closed: AX...,::Jy[ys;;;x 1\ OPEN(y)] 
Other examples of total/partial predicates are clean/dirty, healthy/sick. dry/wet, 
Jail/pass, smooth/rugged, and emptylfilled. 
Without doubt. the total vs. partial interpretations of predicates l ike closed 
and open is an important phenomenon of semantic interpretation that has not yet 
received the attention it deserves. However. it seems that it is not strictly a lexical 
property, as Yoon ( 1 994) has proposed . For imagine the following si tuation: The 
local bank has a safe that is accessible only through a hal lway with three doors, all 
of which must be open to reach the safe. 
( 1 2) a. I could reach the safe because the doors were open. 
b .  I could not reach the safe because the doors were closed. 
Under the given circumstances, ( 1 2 .a) expresses the fact that all the doors were 
open, whereas ( 1 2 .b) expresses the fact that at least some of the doors were 
closed. As the total ity vs. partiality of the interpretation is shifting with the con­
text, it cannot be just a lexical property. 
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Here I will not try to develop a theory of total and partial interpretations of 
predicates. Regardless how their semantic behavior will ultimately be explained, 
Yoon ( 1 994) observes that those predicates show similar differences in interpreta­
tion with donkey sentences: 
( 1 3) a. Usually, if a man has a garage with a window, he keeps it closed while 
he is away. 
b. Usually, if a man has a garage with a window, he keeps it open while 
he is away. 
( 1 4) a. Most boys who had a baseball card in their pockets kept it clean while 
playing in the mud. 
b. Most boys who had a baseball card in their pockets got it dirty while 
playing in the mud. 
The preferred interpretation of ( 1 3 .a) has the dependent variable interpreted uni­
versally; to count as a verifying case, a man that has a garage with a window must 
keep all the windows closed. The preferred interpretation of ( 1 3  . b) is existential; it 
is sufficient that the man keeps at least one of the windows open. Examples ( 1 4) 
have the same preferred interpretations. We find that total predicates like closed 
and clean applied to the dependent variable lead to a universal interpretation, and 
that partial predicates like open and dirty lead to an existential interpretation. 
This phenomenon is quite subtle, and so Yoon ( 1 994) designed a con­
trolled experiment. 50 subjects were exposed to written test sentences. There were 
two test sentences per category (total/partial predicates in plural predications, and 
corresponding total/partial predicates on the dependent variable of a donkey sen­
tence) .  No subject was exposed to both members of a pair of test items, that is, no 
subject had to judge both a sentence like The windows are open and The windows 
are closed, in order to prevent subjects from attempting to stay consistent with 
their answers. Furthermore, the test material contained many distractor items. The 
subjects were instructed to read each sentence separatly and judge whether the 
sentence could be truthfully asserted in the described situation or not. Here is an 
example for each of the four categories: 
( 1 5) a. The children are sick. 
Situation: Susan has 5 children. 3 of them have come down with the 
flu while the other 2 are healthy. (Expected answer: True) 
b. The children are healthy. 
Situation: Susan has 5 children. 2 of them have come down with the 
flue while the other 3 are healthy . (Expected answer: False). 
( 1 6) a. Every farmer who owned a donkey kept it healthy during the rainy 
season. 
Situation: We have 5 farmers. One of them owned one donkey and 
kept it healthy during the rainy season. The other 4 each owned 1 0  
donkeys, and each let 3 or 4 of their donkeys get sick during the rainy 
season while keeping the others healthy. (Expected answer: False). 
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b .  Every farmer who owned a donkey let it get sick during the rainy sea­
son. 
Situation: We have 5 farmers. 2 of them each owned one donkey and 
let it get sick during the rainy season. The other 3 owned 1 0  donkeys 
and each let 2 or 3 of their donkeys get sick during the rainy season 
while keeping the others healthy. (Expected answer: True) 
With 1 00 answers per category (two sentences and 50 subjects), Yoon obtained 
the following result: 
( 1 7) a. Predication on sum individual with total predicate: 84% as predicted. 
Predication on sum individual with partial predicate: 82% as predicted. 
b. Donkey sentences with total predicate: 74% as predicted. 
Donkey sentences with partial predicates :  78% as predicted. 
These results are highly interesting. For one thing, ( 1 7.a) establishes that 
predicates like closed and open are indeed preferably interpreted as total and par­
tial, respectively. Secondly, ( 1 7.b) shows that these predicates lead preferably to a 
universal or existential interpretation when predicated on the dependent variable 
of a donkey sentence. Finally, ( 1 7.a) and (b) together establish a correlation be­
tween total/partial predications on sum individuals and universal/existential predi­
cations on the dependent variable of donkey sentences. 
Now, the dependent variable in examples ( 1 3) and ( 1 4) is a singular pro­
noun, a situation for which the notion of total and partial predicates is not appli­
cable.  So this correlation comes as a surprise for the classical representation of 
donkey sentences. Perhaps this points to a flaw in the classical representation? 
4. Consequences for the Representation of Donkey Sentences 
Yoon ( 1 994) argues that the correlations in ( 1 3) and ( 1 4) indeed should lead to a 
revision of the received representation of donkey sentences. She proposes that the 
dependent variable should be interpreted as the sum individual that consists of all 
the individuals that its antecedent can be anchored to. The predicate on the de­
pendent variable in the nuclear scope then is predicated on this sum indivdual . In 
case this predicate is a total or partial predicate, it will lead to a universal or exis­
tential interpretation, respectively .  This predicts that ( l S .a) has a universal inter­
pretation, and ( 1 9.b) has an existential interpretation. 
( 1 8) a. Every boy who had a baseball card kept it clean. 
b .  Analysis by way of paraphrase : Every boy who had a baseball card 
kept the baseball card(s) that he had clean. 
c. The basebal l cards that he had were clean. (total/universal) 
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(1 9) a. Every boy who had a baseball card got it dirty. 
b. Analysis by way of paraphrase: Every boy who had a baseball card got 
the baseball card(s) that he had dirty. 
b. The baseball cards that he had were dirty. (partial/existential) 
One problem of this analysis is that the donkey pronoun (here, it) is singu­
lar, but has to be spelled out by a potentially plural noun phrase. But Lappin 
( 1 989), who proposes a similar representation, argues that this is because the 
number of the pronoun is triggered by purely syntactic agreement. Independent 
evidence for that comes from the number of the pronoun in the following cases: 
(20) a. Every farmer who owns at least one donkey beats it. 
b.  Every farmer who owns at most three donkeys beats them. 
Another potential problem of this analysis is that it seems to predict that the 
predicate of the donkey pronoun may be collective, which is clearly not the case: 
(2 1 )  *Every farmer who owns a donkey rounds i t  up at night. 
However, notice that the pronoun it must, of course, accomodate cases in which a 
farmer j ust owns a single donkey, and in this case the collective predicate round 
up could not be applied. 
There are a number of proposals for the representation of donkey sen­
tences along the lines indicated here. They are originally motivated by the maxi­
mality effect in the interpretation of pronouns as in the following cases (cf. Evans 
1 980) :  
(22) Harry owns some donkeys .  Tom vaccinated them. 
:=::: Tom vaccinated all the donkeys that Harry owns. 
Theories l ike Kamp ( 1 98 1 )  and Heim ( 1 982) do not give us this interpretation of 
these so-called E-type pronouns .3 Examples like (22), as well as the universal 
interpretation of dependent variables, have led to the suggestion of alternative 
theories (cf. Heim 1 990 for discussion). 
For example. Neale ( 1 990) proposes that donkey pronouns are spelled out 
as numberless definite descriptions derived from the syntactic form of the antece­
dent, essentially simi lar to the paraphrases in ( 1 8) and ( 1 9) .  Problems of this ap­
proach are that it is unclear how this syntactic copying should work in general, 
and that we certainly need semantic inferences for anaphora as in Every farmer 
who owns a donkey beats the animal. 
Lappin ( 1 989) proposes semantic representations of the following type, 
where the donkey pronoun refers to the elements in the highlighted intersection. 
One problem here is that the anaphoric relation between the two highlighted sets 
in the following example is not formal ly captured: 
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(23) EVERY(FARMER 11 {xl DONKEY 11 {Yl OWN(X,y)}) 
{xI 3y[y E DONKEY 11 {yl OWN(X,y)} 1\ BEAT(X,y)} ) 
Chierchia ( 1 992, 1 995) proposes that donkey pronouns can be either 
bound (leading to an existential interpretation) or free (leading to an E-type read­
ing). Free pronouns denote functions that are contextually supplied\, as illustrated 
in (24). A problem with this approach is that there is no theory about how the 
function f is to be construed. It should also be noted, as Chierchia wants to ac­
count for the existential vs. universal interpretation of the dependent variable, that 
he does not provide for an explanation of Rooth's Generalization. 
(24) [EvERY({xI 3y[FARMER(x) 1\ DONKEY(y) 1\ oWN(x,y)] } , {xl BEAT(f(x» } ] ,  
where f = Ax[THE DONKEY(S) THAT x OWNS] 
Lappin and Francez ( 1 994) assume just the functional interpretation But 
they hold that many functions can be selected, two of them being illustrated in 
(25). The problems are similar to Chierchia' s theory: No account is given for how 
the functions are construed, and Rooth's Generalization remains unexplained. 
(25)  a. f= AX[THE DONKEY(S) THAT x OWNS] 
b. f = AX[THE BIGGEST DONKEY x OWNS] 
c. f = . . .  
Yoon ( 1 994) herself proposes an  analysis within extended DRT (cf.  Kamp 
& Reyle 1 993) .  Her DRS construction rules lead to discourse representations of 
donkey sentences in which quantification is only over the independent variable 
(x), cf. (26). The dependent variable (y) in the restrictor triggers the formation of 
an embedded box that contains all the descriptive predicates of which y is an ar­
gument. We form the sum over y under this description (LY) and introduce a dis­
course referent Z that is identified with that sum. 
(26) Every farmer who owned a donkey kept it healthy . 
x Z 
FARMER(X) 
Z = LY y => KEPT(X, HEALTHY(Z» 
DONKEY(y) ALL 
OWNED(X ,y) 
In the nuclear scope, the donkey pronoun can only be interpreted via the discourse 
referent Z. If the nuclear scope contains a total or partial predicate, it is interpreted 
with the preferences that we have established. So, HEALTHY(Z) will be interpreted 
as total, leading to a universal interpretation of the dependent variable. Also, no­
tice that for each instantiation of the independent discourse referent there is a 
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unique instantiation of the dependent discourse referent. This means that we do 
not have to record, with the quantification symbol =>, which discourse referent the 
quantifier is supposed to quantify over. 
5. Sum Predications and Pragmatic Strenghtening 
Yoon's representation predicts the universal or existential interpretation of de­
pendent variables in case predications with total and partial predicates are in­
volved, but it does not capture Rooth's Generalization, which was formulated for 
predicates that do not fall into the total/partial category. I would like to propose 
that Rooth's Generalization follows from the way how predications on sum indi­
viduals are understood in general. Observe the following examples; I have given a 
straightforward semantic representation of the English sentences that stays close 
to surface structure, followed by an analysis how (a) is actually understood. 
(27) a. The windows are made of security glass. 
b. MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(THE WINDOWS) 
c. V'x[x � THE WINDOWS -+ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
(28) a. The windows are not made of security glass. 
b. ..., [MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(THE WINDOWS)] 
c. ...,3x[x � THE WINDOWS 1\ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
(27.a) is preferably interpreted as (27.c), 'All  the windows are made of security 
glass ' ,  whereas (28.a) is preferably interpreted as (28.c), 'None of the windows 
are made of security glass' .  Notice that (28 .a) is not simply the logical negation of 
(27.a) ,  in contrast to what is suggested by the surfacy representations (27.b) and 
(28.b) .  One possible explanation of this discrepancy is that (28 .b) is not the right 
representation of (28 .a) after all. Rather, the negation in (28 .a) should be predicate 
negation, which leads to the following representation: 
(29) a. The windows are not made of security glass. 
b. [...,MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(THE WINDOWS)] 
c .  V'x[x � THE WINDOWS -+ [-,MADE OF SECURITY GLASS](X)] 
<=> V'x[x � THE WINDOWS -+ ..., [MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)]] 
<=> ...,3x[x � THE WINDOWS 1\ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
However, the assumption of predicate negation does not help in many other cases 
that are similar to (28) as they express some negation of (27) that is not simply 
logical negation. Consider the following cases : 
(30) a. Mary believes that the windows are made of security glass. 
b. Mary doubts that the windows are made of security glass. 
(3 1 )  a. Many people believed that the windows were made of security glass. 
b. Few people believed that the windows were made of security glass. 
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(30.a) reports a belief of Mary that all the windows are made of security glass, 
and (b), that none of them is made of security glass. (3 1 .a) says that many people 
believed that all the windows were made of security glass, whereas (b) says that 
few people believed that any of them was made of security glass. At least, these 
seem to be the preferred interpretations. In these examples, the constituent sen­
tence the windows are made of security glass is preferably understood as involv­
ing a universal quantification over the windows in the (a) case, and as a (narrow­
scope) existential quantification in the (b) case. - We find similar tendencies for 
NPs denoting sum individuals in object position: 
(32) a. Mary has read the files on her desk. 
b. Mary has not read the files on her desk. 
(32.a) is preferably understood as saying that Mary has read every file on her 
desk, whereas (32.b) is preferably understood as saying that Mary has read none 
of the files on her desk. Notice that even if we analyze not here as predicate nega­
tion, pure logic would give us another interpretation, namely, that Mary has not 
read every file on her desk (i.e., she may have read some). 
Yoon ( 1 994) included negated and non-negated sentences in the test re­
ported in section (4) above. Her result for sentences with stative predicates is as 
follows (again, 50 subjects, 2 sentences per category): 
(33) a. Non-negated sentences: 90% universal interpretation. 
b. Negated sentences : 76% (narrow scope) existential interpretation. 
This correlation has not gone completely unnoticed, as I found out re­
cently. Lappin ( 1 989) argues that plural pronouns and conj unctive NPs in the 
scope of upward-entail ing operators receive a "conj unctive", i .e .  universal, inter­
pretation, and in the scope of downward-entai ling operators, a "disjunctive", i .e .  
existential , interpretation. Lappin considers the fol lowing examples : 
(34) a. No man found them . 
b. No one saw John and Mary at the party yesterday . 
c. Less than five people wanted Max and Sally to address the meeting. 
In each case, the disjunctive or existential interpretation is preferred :  (34.a) says 
that no man found any of them, (b) says that no one saw either John or Mary, and 
(c) says that less than five people wanted either Max or Sal ly to address the 
meeting.4 In all these cases we find the existential interpretation of the NP denot­
ing a sum individual . 
The data discussed in this section then lead to the following observation, 




A non-collective predication P(x) on a sum individual x is preferably 
interpreted as 
(i) 'v'y[y s;;;; x -+ P(y)], if P(x) is in an upward entailing environment, 
(ii) 3y[y s;;;; x /\ P(y)], if P(x) is in a downward entailing environment. 
The restriction to non-collective predications excludes the application of this 
principle to sentences like The students gathered or The students did not gather. 
A statement like (35) is still a bit unsatisfactory, as it involves a very spe­
cific interpretation rule just for the case of plural predications. We should try to 
derive Lappin's Generalization from more general principles. Take again example 
(27) and (28) on their preferred (b) and dispreferred (c) interpretations: 
(36) a. The windows are made of security glass. 
b. 'v'x[x S;;;; THE WINDOWS -+ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
c. 3x[x S;;;; THE WINDOWS /\ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
(37) a. The windows are not made of security glass. 
b. .,3x[x S;;;; THE WINDOWS /\ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
c. .,'v'x[x S;;;; THE WINDOWS -+ MADE OF SECURITY GLASS(X)] 
If we compare the preferred interpretations and the dispreferred interpretations in 
terms of their logical strength, we arrive at the following observation: For (36), 
the preferred interpretation, (36.b), logically entails the dispreferred interpretation, 
(36 .c). Similarly for (37) : The preferred interpretation (3 7.b) logically entails the 
dispreferrred interpretation (37.c). In general, the preferred interpretations are 
logically stronger than the dispreferred interpretations. This holds for the other 
cases we have considered as wel l .  
What this suggests is that in predications on sum individuals, the  logically 
stronger interpretation is preferred. More precisely, I would like to propose the 
fol lowing two hypotheses (38)  and (39) :  
(38) If a predicate P applies to a sum individual x, grammar does not fix 
whether the predication is universal ('dy[ys;;;;x -+ P(y)] ) or rather exis­
tential (3y[ys;;;;x /\ P(y)]), except if there is explicit information that en­
forces one or the other interpretation. 
Explict information that enforces a particular interpretation could be the presence 
of a universal quantifier, like all the windows, of a distributive operator, l ike in 
are each made of security glass, or interpretations of the predicate P that are lexi­
cally enforced or situationally preferred, e.g. if P is a total or partial predicate like 
are clean or are dirty. 
(39) If  grammar allows for a stronger or a weaker interpretation of a struc­
ture, choose the one that results in the stronger interpretation of the 
sentence, if consistent with general background assumptions ! 
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Lappin' s  generalization (35) then follows from the interpretation rule for plural 
predicates (38) and the general pragmatic rule (39). The question now is whether 
these two rules can be independently motivated. 
The interpretation rule (38) is, in some sense, a null hypothesis. Grammar 
has to specify the truth conditions for P(x) if x is an atomic individual. Further­
more, it is natural to assume that the truth of P(y), y being a sum individual, will 
somehow depend on whether P applies to the parts of y. Now, if nothing indicates 
any particular proportion to which P should apply to the parts of y, then the two 
natural extreme options are the universal interpretation and the existential inter­
pretation. 
For the pragmatic rule (39) there is some independent evidence. Dalrym­
ple, Kanazawa, Mchombo & Peters ( 1 994) have proposed the "Strongest Meaning 
Hypothesis" for reciprocals (see also Kim & Peters 1 995 and Winter, this vol­
ume). This hypothesis states that reciprocal statements can be interpreted as in­
volving a whole family of possible interpretations that are related to each other by 
logical strength, and that the interpretation actually selected is the one that yields 
the logically strongest truth conditions that are still compatible with the general 
background knowledge. Two illustrative examples are the following: 
(40) a. The five players know each other. 
b. The five players sat alongside each other. 
(40.a) selects the logically strongest interpretation of the reciprocal ('every player 
knows every other player') .  This interpretation is physical ly impossible for (40.b) , 
which settles for a weaker interpretation, but sti l l  for the strongest possible one, 
given the circumstances. Interestingly, the judgements change in the way pre­
dicted here when these sentences are embedded in downward entai ling contexts :  
(4 1 )  a. The five players don't know each other. 
b. Mary doubts that the five players know each other. 
These examples preferably express (Mary ' s  belief) that none of the five players 
knows any other player, which is not just the logical negation of (40.a). This 
shows that the absolutely weakest interpretation of the reciprocal is  selected, 
which is the strongest one in this context. 
The pragmatic rule (39) may be related to so-called "R-based Implica­
tures", cf. Hom ( 1 984). These implicatures state that in certain circumstances, a 
speaker can derive the strongest possible interpretation that is consistent with 
what is said and with the the background knowledge. For example, from a sen­
tence like Mary was able to solve the problem we can infer that Mary solved the 
problem. 
Furthermore, (39) seems to be important for the interpretation of embed­
ded questions. Lahiri ( 1 99 1 )  has argued that in sentences l ike Mary mostly knows 
who passed the exam, the adverb mostly specifies the proportion to which Mary 
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knows the answers to the embedded question. In case no explicit proportion is 
given, as in Mary knows who passed the exam, the proportion is assumed to be 
total or universal, that is, Mary knows all the answers. However, notice that a 
sentence like Mary does not know who passed the exam is typically interpreted as 
saying that Mary does not know any answer to this question, that is, we find an 
existential interpretation. 
A possible objection against (39) is that it seems to predict that scopally 
ambiguous sentences like every data set was checked by a student always lead to 
the interpretation that entails the other interpretations (that is, the wide-scope in­
terpretation of a student). This is not so. Rule (39) forces the strongest interpreta­
tion that a particular linguistic structure can get. Under the assumption that sco­
pally ambiguous sentences are disambiguated at some level in the syntax­
semantics interface, e.g. at a level of Logical Form, scopally ambiguous sentences 
lead to different structures as the input of interpretation. 
One important issue at this point is: At which level is pragmatic strength­
ening to be evaluated within a structure that allows for multiple embeddings? Let 
us discuss the following example: 
(42) [S l  Mary doubts that [S2 the windows are not made of security glass]] 
Evaluated at S2' we would expect the existential interpretation. Evaluated at S l > 
we would expect the universal interpretation. It appears to me that (37) actually 
can be understood in either way. This is reminiscent of the flip-flop effects in the 
licensing of polarity items. However, these effects are limited (cf. Kritka 1 995), 
and we should expect similar limitations in the present case. For example, (37) 
can be understood as expressing a doubt of Mary with regard to a previously ut­
tered sentence, S2, which leads to pragmatic strengthening on the level of S2' 
6. A Derivation of Rooth 's Generalization 
Let us return to the universal and existential interpretations of the dependent vari­
able of donkey sentences. It should be obvious by now how we can derive 
Rooth's Generalization from Y oon' s representation of donkey sentences and 
Lappin's Generalization about the interpretation of plural predications. Let me 
illustrate this .  According to Yoon, (43 .a) is interpreted as in (b) : 
(43) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it .  
b .  Every farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey(s) that he owns. 
Grammar leaves it open whether the plural predication beats the donkey(s) that he 
owns is to be interpreted universally or existentially. The VP argument of every i s  
upward entailing; so pragmatic strengthening leads to the universal interpretation. 
The following example is handled in the same way, except that the VP argument 
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of no is downward entailing, which leads to a preference for the (narrow-scope) 
existential interpretation of the plural predication. 
(44) a. No farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
b. No farmer who owns a donkey beats the donkey(s) that he owns. 
These examples show that, in general, Rooth' s Generalization can be de­
rived. We have derived it from two independently justified ideas: First, Yoon's 
representation of donkey sentences that involve plural predications on the depend­
ent variable, which was motivated by the interpretation of total and partial predi­
cates. Second, Lappin's Generalization about how plural predications are inter­
preted in upward entailing and downward entailing contexts. This generalization 
in turn is a consequence of a plausible assumption about the underspecified inter­
pretation of predications on sum individuals, and of an independently motivated 
rule of pragmatic strengthening. 
Unfortunately, this is not all there is to say about the universal and exis­
tential interpretation of the dependent variable of donkey sentences. In the next 
section, I will mention an independent principle, and in the following section, I 
will review a couple of alternative explanations. 
7. An Additional Principle: Domain Narrowing 
It is well known that Rooth's Generalization can be violated in certain cases . Take 
the following example by Schubert & Pelletier ( 1 989), as statement about the be­
havior of men in a parking lot: 
(45) Usually, if a man has a quarter in his pocket, he puts it in the meter. 
Clearly, the existential interpretation of the dependent variable is preferred. 
Barker ( 1 993) has explained this by a phenomenon called domain narrowing. As 
quantified statements in general, donkey sentences allow for an implicit contex­
tual narrowing of their restrictor. Making such restrictions explicit. a sentence like 
(45) can be paraphrased as follows : 
(46) Usual ly, if a man has a quarter in his pocket (and the parking meter is 
not broken, the parking meter is empty, etc. ).  he puts it in the meter. 
Barker suggests that as soon as a man instantiates the required behavior by putting 
a quarter from his pocket in the meter, the highlighted implicit restriction changes 
to false, and said man is  not required to put more quarters into the meter, even if  
he has more of them in his pocket. 
I think that domain narrowing is very plausible, but it is a principle that i s  
orthogonal to  Rooth' s  General ization. Domain narrowing wil l ,  by i t s  nature, ap­
pear with episodic sentences. and not with statives, while Rooth ' s  Generalization 
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holds for stative predicates as well. It is still unclear, though, how domain narrow­
ing of this sort should be integrated in the logical interpretation of quantifiers . .  
8. A Review of Other Suggestions 
Kadmon ( 1 990) has proposed that donkey sentences like ( l .a,b) with a singular 
dependent variable come with a uniqueness presupposition, here, that every 
farmer who owns a donkey owns exactly one donkey. In this case, the universal 
interpretation and the existential interpretation of the dependent variable collapse 
into one. But uniqueness can be cancelled, in contrast to bona fide presupposi­
tions: 
(47) a. Every farmer who own a donkey beat it, and if a farmer owns two or 
more donkeys, he beats them too. 
b. # The current king of France visited the exhibition, although we all 
know that France is a repUblic. 
Hence uniqueness cannot have the status of a presupposition. We can observe, 
however, a related effect: If there is a presupposition of non-uniqueness, then 
singular dependent variables are clearly disfavored. Knowing that all Iowa farm­
ers that raise turkeys raise many of them, (48.a) is odd, and (48 .b) is preferred.s 
(48) a. # Most Iowa farmers that raise a turkey sell it for Thanksgiving. 
b. Most Iowa farmers that raise turkeys sell them for Thanksgiving. 
Barker ( 1 993) suggested that donkey sentences l ike ( l .a,b) rather come 
with a homogeneity presupposition, here that each farmer that owns a donkey 
either beats them all ,  or beats none of them. Again, the universal interpretation 
and the existential interpretation coincide in such models. But it turns out that 
homogeneity can be cancelled, hence cannot be a presupposition: 
(49) Most farmers in the vil lage that own a donkey beat it. But Pedro, who 
owns two donkeys, beats only one of them. 
Another attempt for an explanation was put forward by Kanazawa ( 1 994). 
Sanchez-Valencia ( 1 99 1 )  and Dowty ( 1 994) have observed that the monotonicity 
properties of operators facilitate logical inferences. For example, if it is known 
that a context Xa Y is downward entailing in a, then it will fol low that, if  13 logi­
cally entai ls  a, then XaY wi ll logical ly entail XI3Y. Sanchez-Valencia and Dowty 
claim that natural language operators are typically upward entai l ing and down­
ward entail ing because such operators allow for easy computation of logical con­
sequences. 
Kanazawa ( 1 994) proposes that dependent variables of donkey sentences 
are interpreted in a way as to preserve such inference patterns, and hence, to facili-
PRAGMATIC STRENGTHENING IN PLURAL PREDICATIONS AND DONKEY SENTENCES 1 5 1  
tate the computation of logical entailments. He observes that we readily draw in­
ferences like the following, due to the fact that every, no and some are monotone 
in their restrictor argument, and own andfeed expresses a subconcept of own. 
(50) a. Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it. => 
Every farmer who owns and feeds a donkey beats it. 
b. No farmer who owns a donkey beats it. => 
No farmer who owns and feeds a donkey beats it. 
c. Some farmer who owns and feeds a donkey beats it. => 
Some farmer who owns a donkey beats it. 
Now, these inferences only hold under the unversal interpretation of the depend­
ent variable in (50.a), and under the existential interpretation in (50.b,c). Hence 
Kanazawa proposes a principle that in a donkey sentence with interpretation Q(A, 
B), where Q is a quantifier that allows for a upward or donward entailing interpre­
tation on both arguments, the dependent variable is quantified in such a way (i.e., 
existentially or universally) that monotonicity inferences are preserved. 
There are at least two problems to this analysis. One is that there are good 
arguments not to treat some, as in (50.c), as a quantifier of the same type as every 
and no. There are differences in the anaphoric potential in these quantifiers; for 
example, the premise of (50.c) can be continued with It likes that, in contrast to 
the premises of (50.a,b). Quantifiers like some are to be treated as existential 
quantifiers, not as quantifiers that express a certain relation between two sets. 
More seriously, Kanazawa's  theory fails to make any prediction for quan­
tifiers like most or less than 90 percent of the that are neither upward entai ling nor 
downward entailing in their restrictor, although their tendency towards the univer­
sal or existential interpretation of the dependent variable in donkey sentences is as 
pronounced. For example, Most farmers who own a donkey beat it is most l ikely 
interpreted as universal on its dependent variable, and Less than 90 percent of the 
farmers who own a donkey beat it as existential . Rooth' s  General ization, and 
hence the present paper, makes the right predictions in these cases .  
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for financial support by the National Science Foundation, #SES-9022 1 92,  and 
by the University Research Institute, University of Texas at Austin. 
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I Rooth ( 1 987) also considers as a possibility the case in which the dependent 
variable is quantified by the same quantifier that occurs in the overall quantifi­
cation, in our example, MOST. 
2 See especially section (7) for exceptions. 
3 But see Kritka ( 1 996) for a theory how maximal interpretations can be achieved 
within a framework of dynamic interpretation. 
4 Lappin ( 1 989) is mostly about donkey sentences with plural antecedents of the 
dependent variable. He argues for an E-type analysis of donkey sentences (cf. 
(23» , but does not see the connection of this observation to existential vs. uni­
versal interpretations of Donkey pronouns. 
5 Thanks to Lee Baker, pers. communication, for these turkey sentences. 
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